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Should Juries and the Death Penalty Mix?:
A Prediction About the Supreme Court's Answer
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
Although still in its infancy, the Capital Jury Project has already vastly
improved our understanding of the jury sentencing process in capital cases.
As the foregoing articles make clear, the overall import of this research is that
jury decision-making in death penalty cases is unpredictable and perhaps even
lawless. The question addressed here, through the vehicle of a mock United
States Supreme Court opinion, is whether this finding has any constitutional
significance.
The Court's death penalty decisions have routinely given short shrift to
empirical data. One could even say that the Court considers social science
research "irrelevant" to death penalty jurisprudence, at least if relevance is
defined to include both of its two commonly accepted components: the
materiality of a given piecd of evidence, and the probative value (or strength)
of the evidence.a In its earliest death penalty decisions of the modern era, the
Court's response to social science research rested upon a perceived lack of
probative value. Consider, for example, the Court's mid-1970's decisions
upholding the death penalty against constitutional challenges. Although
conceding that studies concerning the deterrent effect of capital punishment
would be useful (i.e., material) in assessing its constitutionality, the Court
labeled as "inconclusive" those studies which suggested that the death penalty
has only a minimal deterrent impact, and thus resorted to intuition in deciding
that the death penalty does deter crime.b Similarly, in Witherspoon v.
Illinois,c the Court questioned the probative value of data suggesting that
death-qualified juries (i.e., juries from which people who will not vote for the
death penalty are removed) are more prone to convict at the trial stage of a
capital case. Although the Court appeared willing to consider conviction-
proneness an impediment to achieving the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
jury impartiality, it concluded that the research extant at the time (a total of
three studies) was "too tentative and fragmentary" to be helpful on the issue.
Eighteen years later, despite twelve confirmatory studies, then-Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Lockhart v. McCree' continued to insist that social
science had nothing worthwhile to say on the conviction-proneness issue. This
time, however, the Court directed most of its attention to the materiality
* Professor of Law & Alumni Research Scholar;, University of Florida School of Law. L.L.M.,
University of Virginia School of Law, 1979; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1977.
a. See generally McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (4th ed. 1992).
b. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
c. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
d. Id. at 517. The Court continued: "In light of the presently available information, we are not
prepared to announce aper se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by
a jury selected as this one was." Id. at 518 (italics in original).
e. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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question. Rehnquist noted that even if the new research did prove that a
death-qualified jury is more conviction-prone than a jury not so constituted,
it was not pertinent to the Sixth Amendment issue: the Impartiality Clause
only guarantees jurors who are willing to abide by their oath, not jurors with
particular types of attitudes! In a similar vein, Justice Powell's decision in
McCleskey v. Kempg made only a half-hearted attempt at attacking either the
methodology or findings of the Baldus study,h a mammoth undertaking which
demonstrated that murderers who kill white victims are much more likely to
be sentenced to death than those who kill blacks. Instead, Powell concluded
that the research was immaterial because it did not show that discrimination
or arbitrariness infected any particular case in which the victim was white.'
How would the current Court react to the types of data reported in the five
principal papers published in this issue of the Indiana Law Journal? The
following opinion by "Justice O'Rehnedy" reflects the prediction that a
majority of the Court, most obviously including Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
and Kennedy, would dismiss the research as both immaterial and lacking in
probative value. The three dissenting Justices disagree. The first dissent,
written by "Justice Marnan," adopts the,abolitionist view endorsed by now-
retired Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and the late Justice Marshall' Although
perhaps unlikely to be authored by a current Justice, such an opinion is not
an entirely unrealistic forecast given the strength of the Capital Jury Project's
findings, the still-malleable attitudes of Justices such as Souter and Breyer,k
and the sudden shifts in attitude that death penalty cases seem to inspire. The
f. Id. at 183 ("In our view, it is simply not possible to define jury impartiality, for constitutional
purposes, by reference to some hypothetical mix of individual viewpoints.").
g. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
h. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
i. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294-95.
j. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (per curiam)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
k. Justice Souter has never voiced opposition to the death penalty, but has written or joined several
recent opinions finding in favor of the defendant in such cases. See, e.g., Simmons v. Carolina, 114 S.
Ct. 2187 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892
(1993); Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). Similarly, although Justice Breyer has stated that he
has no fundamental opposition to the death penalty, some commentators suggest that he is "inclined to
side with the court's liberals on the issue." Nancy E. Roman, Breyer's Questions Suggest Tilt to the Left,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at A4. In addition, during his confirmation hearings Breyer avoided giving
a direct answer to the question of whether he agreed with McCleskey. Bruce Fein, Breyer After
Blaclknun, WASH. TIMEs, July 26, 1994, at A16.
I. Witness, for example, both Justice Blackmun's late conversion, and Justice Powell's too-late
conversion (after he retired from the bench). Justice Blackmur's opinions at least implicitly supported
the death penalty until 1994, when he dissented to a denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins on the
ground that the death penalty "as currently administered" is unconstitutional. 114 S. Ct. at 1138
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell never repudiated capital punishment while on the bench, but two years after his
retirement from the Court, he stated:
"It's perfectly clear that if I were in the legislature now, in view of the extended litigation and
the ineffectiveness of the way the system operates, I would vote against the death penalty."..
"I would be inclined to vote against it in any event. We are the only Western democracy that
still retains the death sentence.... We have a system that isn't working, and I doubt very
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second and third dissents, by "Justice Stelia" and "Justice Scavens" respec-
tively, also accept the research, but for different reasons. Justice Stelia uses
it as a springboard for advocating the return of the death penalty process to
its pre-1970's form, while Justice Scavens relies on it in support of his
proposition that jury decision-making be eliminated in capital cases. Although
these dissents are perhaps a bit fanciful, they are not entirely inconsistent with
the thoughts of the Court's most iconoclastic members, Justices Stevens and
Scalia.m
KILLER v. TEXCALIDA
JUSTICE O'REHNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner argues that his death sentence violates the protections of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it was arbitrarily
imposed and thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment. More specifically,
based on studies from the Capital Jury Project, petitioner contends that his
sentence violates the prohibitions set forth in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S.
238 (1972) (per curiam), and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976),
against "sentencing procedures that create[] a substantial risk that [the
punishment will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner," id., at
188 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Petitioner argues that
jurors in death sentence proceedings (1) do not take their job seriously; (2) do
not fully understand the instructions given them by the trial judge; (3) pay
little or no attention to evidence presented at the sentencing phase; and (4) are
generally influenced in the direction of a death sentence by these and other
factors. For the reasons given below, we reject petitioner's arguments and
affirm his death sen'tence.
much whether you could ever by law create a system that would work at the present stage of
our civilization."
Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice Powell's Predicament, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1989, at 29 (second omission in
original) (quoting former Justice Powell).
m. Most relevant in this regard is the debate between Stevens and Scalia about the merits of
"guided discretion" versus "individualized punishment" in Walton v. Arizona. See 497 U.S. 639, 656
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Whereas Scalia opts for the former, he appears to do so primarily out of respect for precedent. See id.
at 672-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Stevens, on the other hand,
justifies his support for wide-open jury decision-making on the ground that discretion has already been
limited by requiring proof of an aggravating factor. See id. at 715-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although
disagreeing on the surface, the two Justices may not be that far apart. See, in particular, the single





We first set out petitioner's arguments in more detail. Petitioner's initial
assertion is that, as a result of a host of factors, many capital sentencing
jurors misapprehend or are overly casual about the import of their decision.
This attitude, petitioner contends, undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of
our holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), barring a death
sentence that rests "on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led
to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere." Id., at 328-29. In support of this factual
contention, petitioner points to a seven-state survey of persons who have
served as capital sentencing jurors,' only one-fifth of whom believed that
either the jury or they as individuals were "most responsible" for the
punishment meted out to the defendant at trial. Nearly one-half of those
surveyed instead felt that the defendant was most responsible for the
punishment; another one-third chose the "law" as most responsible, with three
out of four choosing the law as either the first or second most important
factor of five (the other four being the defendant, the jury, the individual
juror, and the judge).2
Another study based on interviews of capital jurors, this time focusing
solely on Indiana trials, concluded that
[flaced with the choice of recommending either a life sentence (which
might greatly disappoint, and possibly endanger the juror's entire
community) or a death sentence (which will, at least in theory, lead to the
killing of another human being), many death penalty jurors seek, and
manage to find, ways to deny their personal moral responsibility for the
sentencing decision.3
Both this study and an in-depth study of one capital case in Georgia4 quote
extensively from juror statements purporting to demonstrate how jurors
minimize responsibility for their sentencing decision by pointing to the law's
"requirements," the appellate process, and (at least in Indiana, which allows
judicial override of jury sentences) the fact that the jury vote is only a
"recommendation." 5 Finally, the Georgia study describes the beliefs of some
jurors that individuals who are sentenced to die are rarely executed, and that
those who receive a life sentence are often released well before their life
expires-beliefs which are also said to undermine juror concern about
imposing the death penalty.6
1. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).
2. Id. at 1094 tbl. 10.
3. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in
Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1157 (1995).
4. See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from
the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995).
5. Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 1146-52; Sarat, supra note 4, at 1130-31.
6. Sarat, supra note 4, at 1131-33; see also James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital
Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1178 tbl. 5 (1995) (noting that 74%
of jurors who vote for the death penalty believe that a life sentence means the defendant will spend
fewer than 20 years in prison).
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Petitioner's second assertion is that capital sentencing jurors significantly
misunderstand their instructions in ways that undermine what we described in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), as "Furman's basic
requirement": that a death penalty statute replace "arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Id., at 303. Here,
Petitioner relies on a survey of eighty-three persons who had previously
served on capital juries in North Carolina, which found that a substantial
percentage of those surveyed believed, contrary to North Carolina law (1) that
the jury could consider any aggravating factor, including those not mentioned
by the judge (48%); (2) that mitigating circumstances must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt (41%); (3) that a mitigating circumstance may be
considered only if all jurors agree it exists (42%); (4) that a death sentence
is required when there are stronger aggravating than mitigating circumstances
(27%); and (5) that a life sentence is not required even when there are no
aggravating circumstances (36%) or when mitigating circumstances are
stronger than aggravating ones (34%).7 Additionally, the aforementioned
seven-state study found that 41% of those surveyed believed that a death
sentence was required if the defendant's conduct was "heinous, vile, or
depraved," and that 32% believed such a sentence was required if the
defendant would be dangerous in the futures -both beliefs are contrary to the
law announced in our previous decisions. See id., at 304 ("[W]e believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.") (citation omitted).
Petitioner next asserts that, even if capital sentencing jurors can be said to
understand their penalty stage instructions, they do not follow them, thus
again undermining our determination in Woodson and Gregg that the jury be
"circumscribed by the legislative guidelines." Gregg, 428 U. S., at 207 (joint
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In support of this argument,
petitioner presents evidence from the seven-state study indicating that
approximately 50% of those surveyed were "absolutely convinced" or "pretty
sure" of their penalty decision before the penalty stage had begun,9 and that
almost 75% of those surveyed believed that the sentencing instructions
"simply provided a framework for the decision most jurors had already made
[after the guilt stage of trial]."' Petitioner also points to a Kentucky-based
survey focusing on nine jurors who claimed to have changed their minds
about the appropriate penalty between the end of the guilt phase and the final
7. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1165-66 tbl. 1, 1172 tbl. 3.
8. Bowers, supra note I, at 1091 tbl. 7.
9. Id. at 1089-90 tbls. 5, 6.
10. Id. at 1093 tbl. 9.
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vote on the sentence." According to this study, the principal reason for these
changes was not consideration of the evidence presented during the sentencing
proceeding, but the desire to avoid a hung jury.' 2 Petitioner asserts that this
finding reinforces the conclusion that the information presented and the
instructions given at the sentencing stage are superfluous.
Petitioner's final assertion is really a summation of the three foregoing
assertions: Furman and its progeny were violated by his death sentence
proceeding (and apparently all other death sentencing proceedings as well)
because the various deficiencies described above make an improper death
sentence more likely. This theme is echoed in most of the studies that have
been cited. The North Carolina study, for instance, concludes that "[t]he effect
of the jurors' poor understanding of the law is to reduce the likelihood that
capital defendants will benefit from the safeguards against arbitrariness." 3
The author of the Georgia case study concluded in that case that the
"diffusion of responsibility ... invited a death verdict." 4 And, the seven-
state study emphasizes findings that suggest that capital jurors are heavily
influenced by the finding of guilt at the trial stage, the perception that the
prosecution outperforms the defense, and prosecution-oriented misunder-
standings about their instructions. 5
II
Before turning to the legal issues in the case, we are constrained to point
out what we believe to be several "serious flaws" in petitioner's evidence. Cf.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162, 168 (1986). Petitioner's arguments rest
entirely on several research studies, conducted under the aegis of the Capital
Jury Project ("the Project"), which rely on interviews of jurors involved in the
guilt and punishment phases of capital trials in fourteen states since January
of 1988. Typically, four jurors from each jury were interviewed, with the
interviews lasting an average of three hours each. Two problems are
immediately apparent from even a cursory examination of the Project's
methodology.
The first problem is the effect of memory decay. The Project, which began
collecting data no earlier than 1990 in some of the target states (and as late
as 1992 in others), asked jurors a series of detailed questions about compli-
cated legal events occurring several months to several years in the past
(indeed, the Kentucky study included jurors who had served on trials in 1985
and 1986).16 Under such circumstances, the jurors' recall of their knowledge
11. See Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A
Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.. 1183 (1995).
12. Id. at 1198-1200, 1203-06, 1207.
13. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1181.
14. Sarat, supra note 4, at 1135.
15. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1091-1101.
16. Sandys, supra note 1I, at 1189. Professor Bowers estimates that the average delay between the
trial and the interview has been over one year. William Bowers, Statement during National Conference
on Juries and the Death Penalty, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington (Feb. 24, 1995).
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or actions at the time of the sentencing proceeding, much less the knowledge
and actions of others on the jury at that time, is highly suspect. For example,
expecting individuals with no legal training to remember several months or
even years later the evidentiary effect of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the standards of proof associated with each, as required by
the North Carolina study, is naive. As the authors of that study themselves
noted, jurors are best at understanding concepts with which they are
familiar.' 7 Thus, for instance, the fact that many jurors believed, at the time
of the survey, that the jury must unanimously find that mitigating circum-
stances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt may merely reflect the
substitution of well-known legal principles (i.e., unanimity, and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt) for actual memory. Similarly, a belief that a finding of
aggravating circumstances mandates the death penalty or that non-statutory
aggravating circumstances may be considered by the jury could well be a
present-day commonsense conclusion masquerading as a memory of judicial
instructions delivered years earlier. 8 Jurors' memories about certain other
factors, such as what they felt at the end of the guilt stage or how they
reacted to evidence at sentencing, could also be distorted by hindsight bias
resulting from knowledge of the eventual outcome of a case. 9
Further evidence that memory loss affects the Project's findings can be
derived from the fact that the participating jurors did not act in a vacuum. It
is difficult to believe, for instance, that jurors who thought that mitigating
circumstances had to be unanimously perceived, or that any statutory
aggravating factor required the death penalty, would not be disabused of these
notions by more knowledgeable fellow jurors during the deliberation and
voting processes. The mere fact that a large percentage of the jurors
themselves believe they remember their deliberations "very well" or "fairly
well" (a finding of the seven-state study)20 does not contravene these
observations.2' Indeed, some of the studies candidly recognize that jurors
misremembered or disagreed about what happened during sentencing
deliberations. 2
The second obvious problem with the Capital Jury Project research is that
fewer than one-half the people on any given jury were interviewed. As one
of the researchers admits, "[t]he four randomly selected jurors per trial are
not, of course, a sufficient sample for generalizing about the experiences of
17. See LuginbuhI & Howe, supra note 6, at 1169-70.
18. The same can be said for the types of questions reported in the seven-state survey. See Bowers,
supra note 1, at 1086-1101.
19. For an account of the insidious impact of hindsight on memory, see S.A. Hawkins & Reid
Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 197 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 311 (1990).
20. Bowers, supra note I, at 1086 tbl. 2.
21. Perhaps also of relevance here is research in the eyewitness area which indicates that one's
degree of confidence in one's memory is unrelated to (or perhaps even inversely related to) the accuracy
of one's memory. For a summary of the research, see Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 985
(1977).
22. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1146-47; Sandys, supra note 11, at 1203-06.
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all twelve jurors in a given case."23 In other words, even assuming that one
or two of the four jurors interviewed misunderstood a particular instruction
at the time of deliberation and persisted in that misapprehension despite input
from other jurors, this discovery tells us nothing of what the other, non-
surveyed jurors in that case may have understood about the instruction.
Finally, the way in which the jurors were queried may also have reduced the
value of some of their responses. Particularly troubling, given petitioner's
heavy reliance on the answer to it, is the question asking jurors which person
or entity they think is "most responsible" for the defendant's punishment.24
The words "most responsible" are subject to multiple interpretations and are
ultimately insolubly ambiguous. Certainly a juror could believe that the
defendant is the primary cause of his punishment, or that the law provides the
main vehicle for his sentence, while at the same time maintaining the belief
(considered important in Caldwell) that the "ultimate determination of death"
will rest with the jury. 472 U. S., at 333. Particularly puzzling is petitioner's
allegation that jurors who say the "law" is most responsible for the punish-
ment meted out in a capital sentencing proceeding are improperly minimizing
their role.2" The entire import of our decisions since Woodson and Gregg has
been to impose the constraints of law on the jury decision-making process.
That jurors recognize these constraints, one would think, is cause for
optimism, not pessimism, about the death penalty process.
III
Even if we accept the Project's research on its face, we are not convinced
that it provides substantial support for petitioner's four arguments. Beginning
with the assertion that capital sentencing jurors do not take their responsibility
seriously, we note that the survey results seem to be contradictory to a
significant degree. Despite findings that neither the jury nor individual jurors
are generally considered "most responsible" for the punishment imposed, the
research is replete with accounts of jurors who felt burdened by the decision
they had to make. The seven-state study states, for instance, that "it was
common for the jurors to comment that serving as a capital juror was a 'truly
memorable experience,' something they 'would never forget,' because, as
some added, 'it was the most important thing I've ever done."'' 26 The Indiana
and Kentucky studies also contain reports ofjurors who talked of "'the feeling
of the responsibility that you have,"' 27 how "scary" it would be "'if we can
all twelve mutually agree and we're still wrong,' 2 how "'it was just so
hard to say that, for me to think that I should be in a position to say whether
23. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1081.
24. See id. at 1094 tbl. 10.
25. Cf. id. at 1095-96; Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1157-58.
26. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1086 (quoting an unidentified juror).
27. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1143.
28. Id. at 1152 (quoting an unidentified Indiana Juror).
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somebody should live or die,"' 2 9 having nightmares, loss of appetite, crying
(both during and after the proceeding was over),3 ° and the "'overwhelming
responsibility'" of sentencing a man to death.3 Admittedly, the author of the
Indiana study concluded that from eight to eleven members of each jury were
relatively casual about their responsibility, but this conclusion appears to be
based primarily on the perception that most jurors "rather quickly and easily
agreed on a sentencing decision" rather than on admissions from these jurors
themselves that they did not carefully consider their position.32
We also have difficulty agreeing with petitioner that the research concerning
juror knowledge of instructions shows sufficient misunderstanding of the law
to warrant his conclusion that jury decision-making is arbitrary. Again setting
aside concerns about validity, the North Carolina study-which is most
directly on point-still indicates that of the sixteen questions asked about
instructions, eleven were answered correctly by a large majority of those who
felt able to answer.3 3 With two of the remaining five questions, correct
answers outnumbered incorrect answers by a smaller margin. Only three
questions, one of which queried jurors about whether they could consider non-
statutory aggravating factors and two of which inquired into the combination
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances that requires a life sentence,
produced more incorrect answers than correct ones. In each of the latter three
cases, the percentage answering incorrectly fell under 50% (albeit barely).34
In toto, we hardly think that this showing demonstrates lawless decision-
making. Furthermore, we reiterate that whatever the understanding of the
instructions by individual jurors, decision-making in capital sentencing
proceedings is a group process that is very likely to ameliorate ignorance of
the law. Cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978) (holding that a jury of
six or more is required to promote group deliberation and accurate decision-
making).
Petitioner's third contention, that many jurors pay no attention to the
evidence at sentencing, is also not adequately supported by the research. First,
even assuming that they are not infected by hindsight bias, the results from
Kentucky and the seven-state survey showing that many jurors had made their
29. Id. at 1153 (quoting an unidentified Indiana Juror).
30. Id. at 1155.
31. Sandys, supra note 11, at 1216 (quoting an unidentified Kentucky Juror).
32. See Hofflnann, supra note 3, at 1143.
33. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1165-66 tbl. 1, 1172 tbl. 3. The same was true of the
two questions about instructions reported in the seven-state study. See Bowers, supra note 1, at 1091
tbl. 7 (reporting that jurors who stated that the heinousness of the crime required the death penalty
comprised only 40.9% of the sample, compared to 57.7% who did not; jurors who stated that
dangerousness required the death penalty comprised only 31.9% of the sample, compared to 66.6% who
did not).
34. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1165 tbl. 1 (reporting that 48% ofjurors believed that
"[a]mong [the] factors in favor of a death sentence," the jury could consider"any aggravating factor that
made the crime worse"); id. at 1172 tbl. 3 (reporting that 48% of jurors erroneously believed that they
were free to choose among a life or death sentence when they found "one or more factors opposing a
death sentence and none favoring it," and that 48% of jurors erroneously believed that they were free
to choose the sentence if they found "stronger factors opposing than favoring a death sentence").
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decisions about the penalty after the guilt adjudication stage are potentially
misleading to the extent they suggest that jurors did not consider all of the
evidence relevant to capital punishment. The aggravating and mitigating
evidence presented at the sentencing proceeding often merely reaffirms what
was presented at trial. Indeed, in many cases, this evidence revolves almost
entirely around the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's mental
state at the time it was committed,35 which is precisely the focus of many
capital trials.
36
Second, as with petitioner's first contention regarding jury casualness, much
of the research is contradictory. While the data from Kentucky and the seven-
state survey were gleaned from single answers to abstract questions, the
Indiana research, which provides fuller accounts of how jurors actually
behaved, describes juries which "'went down each aggravating and mitigating
circumstances [sic],"' 3 7 "'had a discussion about the mitigating circumstances
.... [T]he main topic involved... whether he would get the death sentence
or not,"''38 "'started with um, the first, uh, aggravating factor-is that what
they call it?,"'39 and "'specifically weighed the aggravating and mitigating
factors."4' It is also noteworthy that a sizeable number of those jurors who
stated that they were "absolutely convinced" or "pretty sure" about their
verdicts after the guilt adjudication phase nonetheless changed their minds
during the sentencing phase.4
Given our dismissal of petitioner's first three contentions, his fourth
argument-that juror nonchalance, ignorance, and close-mindedness all work
to increase the likelihood of an improper death sentence-fails as well. We
cannot resist noting, however, that even if we accept the dim view of capital
sentencing juries that petitioner promotes, his fourth assertion rings hollow on
its own terms. First, contrary to what petitioner would have us believe, the
evidence from the Capital Jury Project suggests that the three supposed
35. Of the eight mitigating circumstances listed in the widely adopted Model Penal Code death
penalty statute, only two (no prior history and youth) do not relate to circumstances at the time of the
offense. Typical mitigating circumstances include domination by another at the time of the offense,
extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, and impaired capacity for appreciation and
control at the time of the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (1980). Of the eight aggravating
circumstances listed by the Code, only two (defendant under sentence, and previous conviction of a
violent felony) do not involve circumstances about the offense. Typical aggravators include the vileness
of the crime, the commission of other offenses during the murder, and the murder of more than one
person at the time of the offense. Id. § 210.6(3).
36. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 331, 332 (1983) ("Were defendant simply to admit guilt and go straight
to the penalty phase trial, the prosecution at that time would undoubtedly present much of what it
otherwise would have presented during the guilt phase.... [M]uch of the defense evidence which would
be presented at the guilt phase, such as evidence of diminished capacity or insanity, also may be
presented at the penalty phase in mitigation.").
37. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1143 (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
38. Id. at 1148 (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
39. Id. (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
40. Id. at 1151 (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
41. See Sandys, supra note 11, at 1194 tbl. 3 (reporting that 13 of 43 jurors who stated that they
had initially favored a particular verdict after the penalty phase ultimately changed their votes by the
end of the sentencing deliberations).
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deficiencies in the jury decision-making process identified above can, and
often do, redound to defendants' benefit.42 More importantly, if petitioner's
view were correct, we would expect to see a significant number of death
sentences being handed down by juries. Yet, sources other than the Capital
Jury Project indicate that most capital juries opt against the death penalty.
Indeed, some estimate the jury death sentence rate to be below 25%,
depending upon the jurisdiction, while most would not put it far above 50%
regardless of the jurisdiction.43 Whatever the correct percentage, capital
sentencing juries do not seem to be "uncommonly willing to condemn a man
to die," Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 521 (1968), despite what
petitioner would have us believe.
IV
Most important to our decision today, however, is that we do not believe
petitioner has made out a constitutional claim even if the empirical evidence
demonstrates what he claims. From this perspective, we again briefly canvass
petitioner's four contentions.
Petitioner first argues that the failure of a significant number of capital
sentencing jurors to take their job seriously fundamentally undermines the
integrity of their verdict. While we did decide, in Caldwell, that a prosecutor's
exaggerated allusion to the nullifying power of appellate courts "presents an
intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance
of its role," 472 U. S., at 333, that decision was predicated upon intentional
misconduct by the state. Even if we were to reverse our decision in Romano
v. Oklahoma, __ U. S. __ .; 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994), and extend Caldwell
to accurate statements about factors which tend to depreciate the jury's role
(such as appellate review, judicial override, and the probability of execution),
state action would still be a predicate for a constitutional violation. The
possibility that capital jurors, on their own initiative, with no prodding by the
prosecutor or judge, might choose to take a relatively casual attitude toward
their decision is not a constitutionally cognizable cause of action, absent proof
that they completely failed to consider the evidence or in some other way
totally abdicated the responsibilities delineated in their oaths. Petitioner has
failed to make such a showing in his case, and we doubt whether any other
individual sentenced to death would be able to do so. We also decline
42. See Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1144, 1147, 1149; Sandys, supra note 11, at 1203-04. But see
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1176 tbl. 4 (stating that various juror misunderstandings will
actually increase the potential for a death sentence).
43. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 233 (1990) (finding that, in ten states, the death sentence rate varied between 25%
(in Delaware) to 74% (in Florida)-the latter a state where judicial override of the jury's recommenda-
tion of life accounts for roughly 25% of the death sentences; only one other state, Mississippi, returned
over 50% death sentences). Other estimates of the percentage of capital offenders sentenced to death
put the figure at less than 25%. See Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi, Lingering Doubts About a




petitioner's invitation to require judges to instruct the jury that they are the
principal arbiters of the defendant's fate, since nothing petitioner has
presented convinces us that the typical juror believes otherwise.
Petitioner's argument that juror misunderstanding of instructions violates the
Eighth Amendment also falls short. In Gregg, we made it clear that to reach
a valid death sentence, a capital jury "must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor." 428 U. S., at 206 (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 877
(1983). Gregg also requires that the jury be allowed to focus on the
"particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the
individual defendant," 428 U. S., at 206 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.), a theme we reiterated in Lockett v. Ohio, which held that
mitigating evidence relating to these issues could not be precluded. 438 U. S.
586 (1978). If, however, the jury verdict is based on at least one statutory
aggravating factor and on a particularized assessment of the crime and the
defendant, then, whatever may be the case under state law, it passes
constitutional muster. None of the North Carolina findings concerning juror
comprehension of instructions even remotely suggests that capital jurors
misapplied these minimum constitutional requirements. A substantial majority
of jurors understood that they could consider any mitigating factors. 44 And by
far the majority of those surveyed knew that aggravating factors had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all the jurors. 4' Even
if, as the research purports to show, a significant number of jurors incorrectly
believe that a death sentence may be imposed when any such aggravating
factor is found to exist,4 6 or when none at all is present, 47 the trial court
implementing our admonition that juries identify the aggravating circum-
stance(s) upon which they rely would discover and reject any death sentence
predicated on these assumptions, thus avoiding a violation of Gregg. Cf. Zant,
462 U. S., at 890-91.
For the reasons given above, we could not countenance a verdict pro-
nounced by a jury that did not consider particularized evidence about the
offense and the defendant. But even if we accept petitioner's third claim that
many jurors have settled on their penalty verdict prior to the sentencing
hearing, we are left unconvinced that these jurors give no weight to evidence
and instructions during the sentencing hearing. At most, petitioner's evidence
shows that they are predisposed to vote a particular way after the guilt phase,
not that they shut their minds to subsequent events.
44. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6, at 1166 tbl. 1 (reporting that 59% of the survey
participants understood that the jury should consider "any' mitigating factor that made the crime not as
bad").
45. Id. at 1165 tbl. I (reporting that 68% of the jurors surveyed knew that aggravating
circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
46. Id. tbl. I (reporting that 48% of jurors believed that the jury could consider "any aggravating
factor that made the crime worse").
47. Id. at 1172 tbl. 3 (noting that 36% of the jurors interviewed believed that the death penalty
could not be imposed when the jury found "one or more factors opposing a death sentence and none
favoring it").
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Finally, even if we accept petitioner's contention that the foregoing
tendencies tilt the sentencing process in the direction of death, we cannot say
that this fact would prove a constitutional defect. As we stated in Lockett,
there can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental
authority should be used to impose death." 438 U. S., at 605 (opinion of
Burger, C.J.). And, as we stated in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279 (1987),
statistics of the type presented by petitioner "at most may show only a
likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions," id., at 308, not
that his own sentence was defective. Finally, as this Court stated in
McCleskey, the kind of empirical evidence petitioner offers here is "best
presented to the legislative bodies."
It is not the responsibility-or indeed even the right-of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the
legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that are "constituted
to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people."
Legislatures also are better qualified to weigh and "evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a
flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts."
Id., at 319 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we deny relief to petitioner.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARNAN, dissenting.
This Court has once again blinked at reality. Confronted by yet another
impressive body of research proving the arbitrariness of the death penalty
process, the Court has again denied that the problems painstakingly described
therein exist. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279 (1987); Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U. S. 162 (1986). Apparently, the Court's trust in the jury is so
blind and its fear of "legislating" so great that no amount of evidence
establishing the deficiencies of the former or the need for the latter will spur
it into action. I reiterate my belief that the death penalty is unconstitutional.
This belief is substantially bolstered by the findings of the Capital Jury
Project, which show that we have failed in our two-decade-long effort to
impose some rationality on the death penalty process. While the inevitable
foibles of jury decision-making can perhaps be endured when the stakes are
less significant, a sentence of death imposed by people who readily believe
that they are mere cogs in the death-sentencing machine, who have great
difficulty in understanding the task at hand, and who are prone to form
premature judgments, cannot be countenanced. I dissent.
I
The majority's attempt to discount the Project's research is disingenuous,
if not dishonest. In Lockhart v. McCree, this Court decried studies relying on
mock jurors and laboratory settings, asking instead for data derived from
"actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to the facts of an actual case
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involving the fate of an actual capital defendant." 476 U. S. 162, 171 (1986).
Yet, when presented with precisely such data, the Court shies away from them
as well. Until we allow observation of the deliberation process and intense
questioning of jurors both during and immediately after its completion, we
will never obtain a complete picture of jury decision-making in capital cases.
In the meantime, we must make do with what we have, and the Capital Jury
Project has offered us the next best alternative.
The majority's concern that memory lapses taint the data is not insubstan-
tial, but neither is it fatal. As the supervisor of the Project states, "We can
evaluate how well jurors actually remember various aspects of this experience
in sophisticated ways with information from trial transcripts and other case
records, through the responses of the other jurors from the same trial, and by
the internal consistency of a juror's responses throughout the interview."4
Although trial transcripts are still in the process of being reviewed by Project
staff, presumably the latter two steps have already been taken with respect to
the results upon which petitioner relies, and thus deficiencies due to memory
loss have been largely controlled for. The fact that only four jurors from each
jury were interviewed is a reasonable compromise as well. The richly textured
accounts of each deliberation process elicited from these four-person samples
can be cross-checked against one another and provide the best approximation
of that process short of contemporary observation.49 And, although it is always
possible to nitpick about the phrasing of questions, as the majority does here,
the fact that the answers to these questions are consistent across jurisdictions
with differing laws, demographics, and mores suggests that the answers are
worthy of attention.
The picture that this methodologically sound research paints of the death
penalty process is nothing short of devastating. The Project has found that
substantially large percentages of those surveyed (ranging from 30% to 80%)
hold the law or the defendant, rather than themselves, accountable for the
penalty decision; misunderstand crucial aspects of their instructions, including
those having to do with constitutional requirements announced by this Court;
and rely on the guilt rather than the penalty phase to obtain most of the
evidence employed in making their sentencing deoision.5 The majority
attempts to downplay these results by suggesting that most jurors understand
the process, or that fewer than half do not, and by rejecting the obvious
implications of juror statements about their decision-making process. The
bottom line, however, is that any given group of twelve jurors will be riddled
with individuals who, to use the majority's language, are either casual,
ignorant, or close-minded, ante, at 1258, or a combination thereof.
While some misimpressions or improper tendencies could perhaps be
corrected by other jurors, the Court grossly overstates this possibility. To take
48. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1086.
49. It should also be noted that the three other studies relying on interviews with capital jurors
produced similar results. See id. at 1073-76 (discussing three previously conducted studies of capital
jurors in Oregon and California).
50. See id. at 1093-98; Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 6.
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the most obvious examples, consider a juror's erroneous beliefs that (1) a life
sentence is not required even if mitigating circumstances are stronger than
aggravating circumstances; (2) aggravating circumstances other than those
enumerated by statute may be considered in arriving at a punishment; and
(3) finding certain aggravating circumstances mandates the imposition of the
death penalty. Because jurors need not disclose to one another the precise
basis for their decision, none of these beliefs will necessarily ever be
challenged in the course of normal jury deliberations. Furthermore, the
research from Indiana and Kentucky makes clear that the few "responsibility
holdouts" who exist on a given jury are unsuccessful at instilling in others a
greater respect for the process. 5
II
Given these empirical facts, the conclusion is inevitable that jury decision-
making in capital cases is highly arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the deficiencies briefly described above cannot be corrected by
clearer, or more forceful, instructions from the trial judge. With respect to
redressing juror nonchalance toward the sentencing decision, it has been
suggested that the judge specifically instruct against such a mindset,5 2 and
inform the jury of the likely details of an execution as well. 3 Contrary to the
majority's conclusion, the failure to give an instruction reminding the jury of
its "truly awesome responsibility" in death penalty cases, McGautha v.
California, 402 U. S. 183, 208 (1971), is sufficient state action for me.
Nonetheless, giving such an instruction is not likely to overcome jurors'
apparently overwhelming penchant, demonstrated by the jurors surveyed by
the Project, for minimizing their burden by reference to appellate review,
judicial override, the low probability of execution, the high probability of
early release, the "law," or some other mechanism. Similarly, apprising jurors
of the literal violence associated with an execution is not likely to inculcate
any further sense of responsibility, if only because most jurors, including
presumably many of those surveyed by the Project, have already been exposed
to such accounts through the media.
In the same vein, while simplifying instructions about the relationship
between aggravating and mitigating circumstances may alleviate some
misunderstanding, experience with such exercises in other legal contexts
indicates that they do not have the kind of substantial impact I believe is
required by the consequences of confusion in a death penalty case.5 a
51. See Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1143-46 (describing how jurors attempted to break down the
holdout jurors' resistance and achieve a unanimous sentencing decision); Sandys, supra note 11, at
1203-07 (noting that, in one particular case, three jurors changed their votes from death to life solely
because they wanted to avoid the possibility of a hung jury).
52. Hoffiann, supra note 3, at 1157-59.
53. Sarat, supra note 4, at 1124-25, 1134.
54. See Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can
Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 213 (1984) (showing that redrafted instructions
concerning intent, reasonable doubt, and prior convictions reduced the error rate in juror comprehension
by only 9% when compared to no instructions, and by only 4% as compared to pattern instructions).
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Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that obfuscating legal language by itself
could lead some 40% of capital-sentencing jurors to accept the clearly
erroneous premise that the death penalty is required if the crime is heinous
and vile, and another 32% of jurors to believe the fallacy, equally obvious
from any minimally adequate instructions, that the death penalty must be
imposed if the defendant is dangerous." These statistics would seem to be
explicable only by the fact that today's public, from which capital sentencing
juries are drawn, has been whipped into an anti-criminal frenzy by the media
and politicians to the point where the "particularized" consideration. of
mitigating factors required by Gregg and Woodson is seen as a waste of time
regardless of the admonitions from the judge.
A final concern is raised by the above-cited statistic that many of those
surveyed believe that a death sentence is required for dangerous defendants.
This belief is wrong not only because we have held that proof of an
aggravating circumstance does not bar a life sentence, but also because in
many of the states from which the jurors were drawn the defendant's
dangerousness is not a permissible aggravator.5 6 Yet, as other data from the
Project attest, dangerousness is clearly a paramount concern of most capital
sentencing jurors regardless of their jurisdiction's law on the matter.17 Even
in those states where the defendant's future dangerousness is a legitimate
factor to consider, its insidious effect is exacerbated by the possibility that
jurors will construe supposedly mitigating circumstances, particularly those
having to do with the defendant's mental disabilities, as suggestive of
potential dangerousness as well. 8 Unless and until the states provide that
life-without-parole is the only alternative to a death sentence and inform
jurors of that fact, cf. Simmons v. South Carolina, __ U. S. __; 114 S.
Ct. 2187 (1994), jurors are likely to use the death penalty primarily as an
incapacitative device,59  concomitantly undermining instructions about
authorized aggravation and the balancing effect of mitigation.
In short, the death penalty cannot be administered in a fair way. Our belief,
stated in Gregg, that "legislative guidelines" will prevent juries from
"wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the death sentence," 428 U. S., at 207
55. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1091 tbl. 7.
56. We upheld the constitutionality of dangerousness as an aggravating factor in Jurek v. Texas,
428 U. S. 262 (1976), but only six states (Idaho, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Washington)
list future dangerousness as a factor in their death penalty statutes. Although after Zant v. Stephens, 462
U. S. 862 (1983), the jury may constitutionally consider non-listed aggravating factors as well, several
states, including Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania (all states involved in the
Capital Jury Project), limit jury deliberation to listed aggravating factors, and do not include
dangerousness on that list.
57. See Sarat, supra note 4, at 1131-33; see also Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1153; Luginbuhl &
Howe, supra note 6, at 1178-79 tbs. 5, 6; Sandys, supra note 11, at 1199-1200, 1216-17.
58. Compare Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979), in which the trial judge considered the
defendant's "dangerous mental illness" as an aggravating factor. While the Florida Supreme Court
reversed the death sentence on this ground, discovery of such improper analysis on the part of a jury
will be much more difficult.
59. Cf James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman Years, 18 N.Y. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 499, 514-15 (1990-1991) (reporting on studies showing that support for the death penalty
drops significantly if incapacitation of the offender is assured).
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(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), has been exposed as nafve
and ill-considered. Regardless of our efforts, the infirmities in capital
punishment discerned in the Furman opinions will remain. For this reason, the
death penalty is unconstitutional.
JUSTICE STELIA, dissenting.
Like Justice Marnan, I believe petitioner's claim is sound for the reasons
so ably outlined in Part I of the Court's opinion, and so inadequately
debunked in Parts II, III, and IV. In all other respects, however, I disagree
with my fellow dissenters as much as I disagree with the majority. The
research conducted by the Capital Jury Project, while a stunning indictment
of the death penalty process, does not support abolition of capital punishment;
rather, it provides a basis for its significant reform. Specifically, for the three
reasons recounted below, I believe that we should return to the pre-Furman
scheme allowing jurors to exercise their "unfettered discretion," albeit with
a few modifications that empirical research and our own experience suggest
are necessary. 60
I
I start with the premise that there is no point in having a jury involved in
the sentencing process if it does not take its task seriously. Unfortunately, as
the research from the Capital Jury Project makes clear, our efforts at "super
due process" have had a paradoxical effect in this regard: the more procedure
imposed on the process, the less responsible jurors feel. 61 This phenomenon
is suggested by the Project's findings that most jurors are quite willing to
hand over their decision-making authority to someone or something else, and
that something else is most often the "law." It is affirmed by the dialogic
evidence produced by the Project's prolonged interviews. As one researcher
from the Project concluded from his in-depth analysis of a case in Georgia,
"the law, with its elaborate structure of rules, reviews, and appeals in capital
cases, diffuses responsibility for the violence which jurors are asked to
authorize. The greater the protections provided for defendants in capital cases,
the greater this diffusion of responsibility will typically be. 62 Another
researcher, basing his conclusions on interview data from a sampling of
Indiana jurors, makes the point rhetorically: "Is it possible to give a 'little'
guidance to a death penalty jury, without the jurors mistakenly concluding that
they are getting a 'lot' of guidance, and thus avoiding their personal moral
responsibility for the sentencing decision?" 6
3
60. For a similar but not identical point of view, see Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death
Penalty, 41 CASE IV. RES. L. REV. 1047 (1991).
61. This possibility was first recognized by Robert Weisberg in Deregulating Death, 1983 Sn'. CT.
REV. 305, 388-95.
62. Sarat, supra note 4, at 1135 (footnote omitted).
63. Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 1159.
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In view of this empirical evidence, the final part of the jury instruction
which this Court upheld inMcGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183 (1971), but
which has since been rendered unconstitutional by our subsequent decisions,
makes eminent sense:
Now, beyond prescribing the two alternative penalties, the law itself
provides no standard for the guidance of the jury in the selection of the
penalty, but, rather, commits the whole matter of determining which of the
two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience, and absolute
discretion of the jury.
Id., at 190. Hand in hand with this type of instruction, which emphasizes both
the discretion and the importance of the jury, any provisions for judicial
override should be repealed, and the jury should be instructed that appellate
review is reserved for finding errors of law and does not correct errors of
fact. Only by removing excuses to shirk their duty can the "truly awesome
responsibility" of imposing a death sentence properly be brought home to
members of a capital sentencing jury.
II
A second reason for dispensing with the trappings of specified aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the associated standards and burdens of proof,
and the rules for balancing these factors, is that jurors do not pay any
meaningful attention to them. In reading the Capital Jury Project's verbatim
accounts of interviews with capital jurors, one cannot escape the impression
that the instructions are virtually irrelevant to the decision-making process-
that what jurors are struggling over is not whether aggravating and mitigating
circumstances were proven with the requisite degree of certainty, but
something more indefinite and yet more central. As one jury foreperson
stated:
"I don't remember consciously thinking, uh, I mean I remember being
afraid that we're misinterpreting, like who are we to interpret these
instructions? I don't think I was aware of a conscious fear of not applying
the law correctly. I think I was more aware of just doing the right-what
I thought, in my heart, was the right thing to do."'
Listen also to the words of one juror (who eventually voted for a death
sentence) attempting to explain the nature of the decision-making process:
"Well again, I guess what is legal is not always ethical and moral. It
should be, and I think it usually is, but it is not always. Again, we're
dealing with a play of personal convictions, and emotions, and all that.
Yes, you want to see the law obeyed, ah, but you're not trying to be
vengeful for instance. And if you feel the law is not correct, of course,
there's just an interplay of feelings, and emotions, and instructions that
come into play in this. Maybe not with every juror, but there was with me.
And, I understood that we were to follow the law and not judge whether
64. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 1152 (quoting an unidentified Indiana juror).
1266 [Vol. 70:1249
SHOULD JURIES AND THE DEATH PENALTY MIX? 1
we felt the law was correct or not. But, yet, at the same time, perhaps you
can't always do that. I don't know.""6 S
These representative excerpts indicate that, at the same time jurors errone-
ously attribute ultimate responsibility for their decision to the "law," they also
treat their instructions as superfluous in deciding what the law requires them
to do.
From this observation one could draw the conclusion that Justice Marnan
does-that juries act irrationally. Or one could make the more generous
inference that their thinking is merely different than what the law would
prefer. Cognitive psychologists have identified at least two different, but
arguably equally valid, models of reaching a decision in a legal case. The
typical capital sentencing statute endorses what has been called the "algebraic
model" of decision-making, under which only the facts produced at the capital
proceeding are considered and each fact is labeled either aggravating or
mitigating, analyzed in terms of whether it is proven with sufficient certainty,
and weighed against one another.66 A second model, which some researchers
claim more accurately represents jury decision-making," is labeled the "story
model." Under this model, "[m]eaning is assigned to trial evidence through
the incorporation of that evidence into one or more plausible accounts or
stories describing 'what happened' during events testified to at the trial."6
In addition to the evidence adduced at trial, "inadmissible" information,
including general knowledge about human behavior and about events similar
to those at issue at trial, comes into play. Consciously or unconsciously, this
information helps flesh out "why certain actions were carried out, what
emotional reaction a person had to a certain event, and so forth," thereby
filling in the evidentiary gaps left by witnesses who "are typically not allowed
to speculate on necessary connecting events" and who "testify to different
pieces of the chain of events, usually not in temporal or causal order.'"69
Put simply, the story model posits that jurors do not employ an element-by-
element, "lawyer-like" template in assessing evidence, but instead simply look
for the most plausible, coherent, and internally consistent account of what
happened and why. As one commentator has stated, this empirical work,
contrary to Justice Marman's supposition, "largely confirms the obvious
proposition that otherwise rational people do not become irrational by being
placed on juries."'7 At the same time, this work suggests that the "algebraic
model" implemented by current capital sentencing statutes is useless to the
typical juror.
65. Sandys, supra note 11 , at 1215 (quoting an unidentified Kentucky juror).
66. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 43, at 149, 161-63 (describing the "algebraic," "story," and "matching" models of jury decision-
making).
67. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making,
51 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242, 242-43 (1986).
68. Id. at 243.
69. Id. at 254.





A final reason for preferring unfettered jury discretion to our present
approach is that fettering discretion, a task first undertaken in Furman and
continued in Gregg, undermines what I consider to be the more important
endeavor of "particularizing" the sentencing decision, an approach first
explicitly required in Lockett. Other Justices have recognized the tension
between trying to limit the scope of the jury's inquiry at the same time the
jury is allowed to consider any evidence the defense presents. See, e.g.,
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 656, 667 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Lockett rule is "an outright
negation of the principle of guided discretion that brought us down the path
of regulating capital sentencing procedure in the first place"); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 628, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that allowing consideration of all mitigating factors "will not
guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it"). But these Justices
have appeared ambivalent about whether resolving this tension requires
moving further in the direction of "guided discretion" or back toward greater
individualization of punishment. See id. To me, the latter approach makes
more sense, because sentencing, in contrast to guilt adjudication, is an
inherently broad-ranging inquiry. As we said in Williams v. New York, "The
belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for
an identical punishment without regard to the past life and particular habits
of a particular offender." 337 U. S. 241, 243 (1948). This sentiment is not
outdated, but reflects the idea that discretion in sentencing is crucial to
achieving just results.
Even if I were prone to favor guided discretion in theory, however, I could
not support it in practice, because as the Capital Jury Project's results make
clear, it is an unworkable approach. First, as noted above, instructions do very
little to structure juror decision-making. Furthermore, regardless of what the
court tells the jury, statutorily "improper" considerations, such as the
defendant's dangerousness, can have dispositive impact on the jury's decision,
while other factors, such as evidence properly admitted at sentencing, may not
be considered at all by those jurors who have made up their minds by the end
of the adjudicative phase.7 ' Rather than fighting these inevitable tendencies
through instructions that cut against the natural story-building schema of the
jurors and distract them from trying to fit the punishment to the crime and the
criminal, the better approach is to impress upon jurors the significance of
their task and let them consider any information they deem important.
IV
For those concerned that adopting these steps will open the door to an
arbitrary proliferation of death sentences of the type condemned in Furman,
71. See generally Bowers, supra note 1, at 1089-91.
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several observations are in order. Most importantly, whereas at the time
Furman was decided many states authorized capital punishment for a wide
array of crimes, including forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, and first-
degree murder,7 2 we have since limited its application to the latter category
of offense, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), thereby permitting
jury imposition of the death penalty only in those cases where it is most likely
to be deserved, if not presumptively so. Indeed, I would go so far as to say
that a sentence of death imposed on a convicted first-degree murderer is never
disproportionate to guilt. The fear that juries will accordingly sentence to
death every defendant convicted of this crime is unfounded, however.
Particularly noteworthy in this regard is that the one survey of verdicts in
first-degree murder cases produced before the current plethora of due process
"protections" found a death sentence rate of 20%, well below the rate in most
jurisdictions today.7 3
Some may still object that the approach advocated here is too likely to lead
to "arbitrary" decisions in the sense that these decisions will be disparate, i.e.,
inconsistent with one another. Given the literally hundreds of variables that
can affect a capital sentencing decision, it is not clear that this argument has
much force. But the concern which underlies it should to a large extent be
allayed by the fact that, since Furman, we have required appellate review of
death verdicts within each state, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 195 (1976)
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), a requirement which I
would continue.
Finally, while its discretion should generally be uncabined, the jury should
not be left completely to its own devices. In contrast to the typical pre-
Furman practice, I would require the judge not only to admonish the jury that
it may not consider factors which have no bearing on whether the defendant
deserves death, but also require specific illustrations of such factors. For
instance, as one commentator has noted, "if the sentencer decides not to
impose [or to impose] the death penalty because of the race of the victim, the
defendant's societal status, a flip of the coin, or whether the sky is blue, then
Furman undeniably is violated."'74 A trial judge could profitably use these
examples in a limiting instruction to the jury.
Petitioner's empirically based claims cast grave doubt on the integrity of the
jury's decision in his case. But if he were to be resentenced for murder by a
jury that is made fully aware of its responsibilities and given unfettered
discretion to consider any factors that rationally relate to whether he deserves
capital punishment, a verdict for death should be upheld.
72. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-4982, at
33 (1984) (reporting on the number of states which, in 1967, authorized the death penalty for, inter alia,
homicide other than murder (20), kidnapping (34), treason (21), rape (19), carnal knowledge (15), and
robbery (10)).
73. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 434-49 (1966). Compare this
statistic to those cited in the majority's footnote 43, supra.
74. Scott Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation




We have held that a capital defendant is not entitled to a jury verdict at the
sentencing phase of the trial. Walton v. Arizona, 947 U. S. 639 (1990). I
believe that we should now hold that a capital defendant is never entitled to
such a verdict. I am not sure whether I agree with Justice Maman that capital
sentencing juries are irrational, or with Justice Stelia that their mode of
analysis is simply antithetical to the legal constructs we have imposed on the
sentencing process. I am convinced, however, that juries cannot satisfactorily
implement the decisional framework established in Gregg and Woodson and
fine-tuned in our later decisions. At the same time, I believe that, if
implemented properly, this framework can avoid the arbitrariness which we
identified in Furman. The intersection of these two lines of thought leads to
the conclusion that judges, and only judges, should make the sentencing
decision in capital cases.
I realize that this reasoning could call into question our entire jury system.
It may be, however, that the ultimate nature of the death penalty places
heavier burdens on lay decision-makers than do other legal contexts, thus
exacerbating any improper tendency that the jury may have to disregard the
law. In any event, here as elsewhere, drawing the line between death penalty
cases and other criminal cases is not constitutionally unsound. As summarized
in California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983), our position has consistently
been "that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments
requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination." Id., at 998-99 (footnote omitted).
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